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1Abstract
In this paper we present results of an experimental study on the perfor-
mance of three mechanisms which are designed to deal with non-point source
pollution: collective ﬁning, random ﬁning, and a tax-subsidy scheme. Our
results show that collective and random ﬁning schemes do not induce the
subjects to play the eﬃcient equilibrium. Experience from participation in
similar treatments further enforces the tendency to under-abate. The tax-
subsidy mechanism, by contrast, induces the eﬃcient equilibrium action to be
played more frequently than the ﬁning mechanisms, with a slight tendency
to over-abate. Experience enforces this tendency. Controlling for the sub-
jects’ risk attitude, we ﬁnd that for risk averse subjects the random ﬁning
mechanism outperforms the collective ﬁne.
Keywords: Non-point source pollution, environmental policy, collective ﬁning, ran-
dom ﬁning, tax-subsidy scheme, experiments.
21 Introduction
It is meanwhile widely acknowledged among economists that pollution control instru-
ments which provide incentives to abate pollution through prices, such as emission
taxes, subsidies, and tradable permits, are powerful and eﬃcient tools in order to
regulate pollution from point sources.1 However, the application of these measures
requires full information about each polluter’s individual emission level, a fact which
prevents its application to control pollution from non-point sources. A non-point
source pollution problem is characterized by the special feature that a pollution con-
trol authority can gather information only about the ambient pollution level but not
about individual emissions. This may be either the case because it is not technically
possible to observe the emissions of each single polluter, or because monitoring them
is prohibitively expensive.
The growing importance of non-point pollution sources, for instance the pollution
of lakes and water sheds from agriculture, has developed a new theoretical and
empirical literature that aims at designing appropriate instruments to deal with
these kinds of problems.2 The feature that the origin of non-point emissions cannot
be monitored creates a moral hazard problem among the ﬁrms which share the same
sink for their emissions. Independently, both Meran and Schwalbe [13] and Segerson
[16] were the ﬁrst to tackle this problem by proposing tax-subsidy schemes where
each ﬁrm is taxed (subsidized) according to social marginal damage when ambient
emissions exceed (fall short of) a level which is considered socially optimal by the
regulator. This approach is based on the work of Holmstr¨ om [8] who addresses the
problem of free riding in teams in a more general environment. A main ﬁnding of
Holmstr¨ om is that, in the absence of uncertainty, no budget balancing mechanism
exists to solve the problem of avoiding individual free riding in teams. Rasmusen [14],
however, revises Holmstr¨ om’s results by observing that budget-balancing contracts
are feasible in an environment of uncertainty if agents are risk averse.
Xepapadeas [21], applies this approach to the regulation of non-point source
1For a survey see [15].
2See [17] for an extended survey on the economics of non-point source pollution control.
3pollution and proposes a new type of contract between each ﬁrm and the regulator
characterized by a combination of subsidies and ﬁnes. While the subsidies paid
to each ﬁrm are proportional to the aggregate reduction of emissions, the ﬁne is
only charged in case that the ambient pollution level exceeds the aggregate emission
standard set by the regulator. In his contribution Xepapadeas studies two diﬀerent
ﬁning regimes: collective and random ﬁning. Under collective ﬁning all the ﬁrms
are ﬁned whenever the observed ambient pollution level lies above that standard.
Under the random ﬁning scheme, by contrast, only one ﬁrm is randomly chosen to
be punished, irrespective of being responsible for the whole group’s deviation from
the required standard.
Whereas Xepapadeas claims his mechanism to be budget balancing, Kritikos [10]
shows that the random ﬁning budget-balancing contract proposed by Xepapadeas is
not incentive compatible when ﬁrms are symmetric and face the same probability of
being ﬁned. Herriges et al. [7] also note that Xepapadeas’ claim contradicts Holm-
str¨ om’s result. They state, however, that his mechanism might induce compliance
if the ﬁrms are suﬃciently risk averse.
Nevertheless, when relaxing the requirement of budget balancedness and choos-
ing the fees suﬃciently high, both mechanisms suggested by Xepapadeas are theo-
retically suitable to implement the eﬃcient allocation of abatement eﬀorts in Nash
equilibrium. However, besides the eﬃcient allocation, intended by the regulator,
there is in general a second, ineﬃcient (symmetric) Nash equilibrium which is char-
acterized by under-abatement. Moreover, there may be many more asymmetric
equilibria, characterized by meeting the standard, though through ineﬃcient alloca-
tion of abatement eﬀorts. This multiplicity of equilibria, therefore, rules out a clear
prediction of the outcome.
Whereas with the collective and random ﬁning mechanisms under-abatement
cannot be ruled out as a possible equilibrium outcome, the mechanism suggested by
Segerson suﬀers from triggering over-abatement. This is so because the subjects can
derive advantage from the feature that the regulator pays a subsidy proportional
to total abatement to everybody. Hence by colluding, ﬁrms can collectively achieve
4more subsidies than in the socially optimal non-cooperative equilibrium. If the
regulation game is played repeatedly and if there is some uncertainty, for example
about the exact number of periods the game is to last, it is well known that collusive
outcomes can even be supported by equilibrium strategies such as trigger strategies
or optimal penal codes (see [1], [5], and [11]).
Inspired by the theoretical analysis, several experimental studies have been con-
ducted to test the eﬃciency of the diﬀerent forcing contracts in inducing the socially
optimum outcome. Spraggon [18] ﬁnds that the tax-subsidy mechanism suggested
by Segerson turns out to be amazingly eﬃcient in achieving the ambient standard
while collective ﬁning performs much worse. Cochard et al. [3], by contrast, use a
setting where the polluting ﬁrms exercise an endogenous negative externality among
each other. Using an extremely high ﬁne the authors ﬁnd the group ﬁne to perform
fairly eﬃciently within this setting. The tax-subsidy scheme, by contrast, induces
considerable over-abatement, that is, ﬁrms reduce the aggregate ambient pollution
level far beyond the socially optimal one.
Vossler et al. [19] introduce uncertainty about the ﬁrms’ sale revenues and allow
for “cheap talk” prior to playing. In this setting, they also propose a mechanism
which combines the tax-subsidy scheme with a ﬁxed penalty. Allowing for non-
bidding communication among the ﬁrms, they conclude that the eﬃciency of the
ﬁxed penalty is increased while under the tax-subsidy mechanism the collusive out-
come is observed.
In a recent paper, Alp´ ızar et al. [2] compare the collective and random ﬁning
mechanisms using a non-budget-balancing version of the mechanisms proposed by
Xepapadeas. Running the experiments with two diﬀerent subject pools, Costa Rican
students, on the one hand, and CEO’s of Costa Rican coﬀee mills, on the other, they
ﬁnd that, ﬁrstly, both ﬁning schemes perform relatively well in achieving the optimal
pollution level when applied to groups of two. Secondly, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences
among ﬁning regimes can be observed in that case. Thirdly, the pool of subjects
does matter: while over-abatement was observed with the managers, the students
tended to under-abate.
5In this paper we present an extension of the study by Alp´ ızar et al. First, we
increase the number of subjects that share the same resource (here, the sink for
pollution) from 2 to 5. Doing so we introduce uncertainty about the decisions of
the other subjects. Secondly, we compare the non-budget balancing versions of
the collective and random ﬁning mechanisms to the tax-subsidy instrument. The
hypothesis to be tested is that the behavior of a risk neutral subject should not be
aﬀected by a change in the ﬁning system since expected gains are identical, and
as the main novelty with respect to the previous experiments, we control for the
risk attitude of the subjects who participate in the experiments, and we investigate
whether or not there is a systematic relationship between risk attitude and the
subjects’ performance in diﬀerent treatments. Thirdly, we analyze how the size of
the ﬁne aﬀects the instruments’ eﬃciency.
We ﬁnd that the tax-subsidy instrument outperforms both the collective and the
random ﬁning scheme with respect to eﬃciency. Whereas in both ﬁning mechanisms
we observe frequent play of the ineﬃcient symmetric equilibrium and also some out
of equilibrium play, mostly inducing under-abatement, we observe a tendency to
over-abatement with the tax subsidy scheme. The latter ﬁnding, resulting from
collusion, is in line with the ﬁndings of Cochard et al., but contrasts from Spraggon.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that experience from participation in one of the other treatments
studied here enforces under-abatement in the ﬁning games while it increases the
tendency to over-abatement in the tax-subsidy scheme.
Raising the size of the ﬁne in the ﬁning games, we would expect compliance
to increase. Surprisingly, we found this to be true only in the collective ﬁning
mechanism when applied to inexperienced subjects.
Finally, we found that risk attitude has an impact on performance for certain
ranges of risk aversion. Whereas the behavior observed under the two mechanisms is
the same for risk neutral subjects, risk averse players increase their abatement when
the group ﬁne is substituted by the random ﬁne. Surprisingly, highly risk averse
subjects show identical behavior to the risk neutral ones when switching from the
collective to the random ﬁning mechanisms. Moreover, risk averse subjects are less
6aﬀected by experience in similar control mechanisms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we brieﬂy outline
the theoretical background. In section 3 we explain the experimental design, and in
section 4 we present our main empirical ﬁndings. Finally, in section 5 we draw some
conclusions and give perspective for further extensions.
2 Theoretical background
Consider an industry consisting of n ﬁrms where each ﬁrm i = {1,...,n} is charac-
terized by both, its default proﬁt Π0
i, incurred without engaging in any abatement
activity, and by its abatement technology represented by an abatement cost func-
tion Ci(ai), where by ai we denote the ﬁrm’s abatement level. The abatement cost
function satisﬁes the following properties: Ci(0) = 0, C0
i > 0, and C00
i > 0. Zero
abatement leads to a maximal emission level emax
i . Thus, the proﬁt function of each
ﬁrm can be written as:
Πi = Π
0
i − Ci(ai) (1)
Total emissions by industry are then given by E =
Pn
i=1(emax
i −ai) and are evaluated
by a social damage function D(E). For simplicity we assume the damage function










where d > 0 denotes the marginal social damage. As in Xepapadeas [21] we consider
a deterministic relationship between the ﬁrms’ emissions and the ambient pollution
level.
In this partial model the regulator’s objective is to maximize social welfare (SW)
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7The socially optimal allocation is then simply characterized by the following ﬁrst
order condition:
C
0(ai) = d (5)
By a∗ we denote the solution of condition (5) and by A∗ = na∗ the corresponding
aggregate optimal abatement. In the following subsections we describe the diﬀerent
instruments designed to decentralize the abatement decisions, that are subject of
our experimental investigation.
2.1 Tax-Subsidy Instrument
The Tax-Subsidy mechanism, suggested by Segerson [16], works as follows. When-
ever the aggregate abatement level falls short of (exceeds) the socially optimal ag-
gregate abatement level A∗, the regulator charges all the ﬁrms with a tax (pays a
subsidy to all the ﬁrms) proportional to the diﬀerence between optimal and actual
abatement. Note that the total tax bill (subsidy payment) is the same for each ﬁrm.
Thus, with this mechanism a typical ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be written as:
Πi(ai,a−i) = Π









where by s we denote the tax or subsidy rate and by a−i the vector of decisions of
the other ﬁrms but i. When implemented as a one-shot or ﬁnitely repeated game,
the unique Nash equilibrium is characterized by the condition
C
0(ai) = s (7)
i.e. the ﬁrms set an abatement level the marginal cost of which equals the tax or
subsidy rate. The Nash strategy is even a dominant strategy which leads to the ﬁrst
best allocation, i.e. ai = a∗, if s equals the social marginal damage d. Note that
the mechanism is not collusion proof as stressed by Hansen [6]. Therefore, if ﬁrms
manage to coordinate on an abatement level higher than socially optimal, they can
earn a higher proﬁt than in the one–shot Nash equilibrium.
It is well known that collusive outcomes can be supported by diﬀerent equilibrium
strategies in inﬁnitely repeated games. Most prominent of these are trigger strategies
8where deviation from the collusive outcome is punished by returning to the one-shot
Nash equilibrium play forever. In some games there exist other more severe, but
also more complicated penal codes (see [1], [11]) which, however, are not very likely
to be coordinated on without allowing for “cheap talk”.
2.2 The Collective and the Random Fining Mechanisms
Next we introduce a non-budget-balancing version of Xepapadeas’ collective ﬁning
mechanism which combines a subsidy proportional to total abatement and a penalty
in case that actual aggregate abatement falls short of the optimal level. Formally a
ﬁrm’s proﬁt can be written as
Πi(ai,a−i) =

   
   





i=1 ai ≥ A∗
Π0 − C(ai) + s
n [
Pn
i=1 ai] − f if
P
i=1 ai < A∗
(8)
where s/n is the share of the total subsidy rate s paid to ﬁrms per unit of pollution
abated by the whole industry, and f denotes the individual ﬁne the regulator charges
each ﬁrm.
The random ﬁning mechanism, a non-budget-balancing version of the mechanism
proposed by Xepapadeas, is very similar to the collective ﬁning mechanism. The
only diﬀerence is that in case of non-compliance only one of the ﬁrms is picked
randomly with probability 1/n and is charged a total ﬁne of F = nf. Note that the
expected proﬁt is the same for both the collective and the random ﬁning mechanisms.
Note also that a ﬁrm which has abated at least a∗ units may happen to be ﬁned if
Pn
i=1 ai < A∗. Thus a typical ﬁrm’s proﬁt is now given by:3
3The version of the random ﬁning mechanism here used is non-budget balancing, since the
amount of the ﬁne collected from one of the ﬁrms is not redistributed among all the other ﬁrms as
done in Xepapadeas [21]. In addition to this, the punished ﬁrm receives its share of the subsidy
s/n. This last modiﬁcation was introduced for the sake of comparability of the experimental results
with those of the collective ﬁning mechanism. Otherwise, the randomly selected ﬁrm would face a
double punishment: the total ﬁne it has to pay and the share of the subsidy it does not receive.
9Πi(ai,a−i)

         
         





i=1 ai ≥ A∗





i=1 ai < A∗ prob. = n−1
n
Π0 − C(ai) + s
n
Pn
i=1 ai − F if
Pn
i=1 ai < A∗ prob. = 1
n
(9)
From (8) and (9) it is straightforward to see4 that the eﬃcient outcome a∗ =
(a∗,...,a∗) is a Nash equilibrium if the ﬁne is chosen suﬃciently high. Consider ﬁrst
the collective ﬁning mechanism. We see that the incentive compatibility condition







implies the following condition for the ﬁne:
F > n[C(a
∗) − C(˜ ai)] + s(˜ ai − a
∗) (10)
for any ˜ ai 6= a∗.
For the random ﬁning mechanism we have to consider the expected proﬁt EΠi(˜ ai,a∗)
since a ﬁrm will be ﬁned with a certain probability lower than 1. Therefore, the





and, for a risk neutral player, this implies that the ﬁne should satisfy condition (10).
Besides the eﬃcient outcome, the game has a second symmetric equilibrium,






In addition to these symmetric equilibria, there may exist other asymmetric
equilibria. Any strategy proﬁle a = (a1,...,an), satisfying
Pn
i=1 ai = A∗, is an
equilibrium if the ﬁrm which chooses the highest abatement level has no incentive
to deviate from this level.
4See [2] and [21].
10Note that both the collective and the random ﬁning games do not exhibit any
collusive outcome which yield higher payoﬀs than the eﬃcient equilibrium. To see
this, observe that the ﬁrst order condition of joint proﬁt maximization5 yields the
ﬁrst order condition C0(ai) = s which is also the equilibrium condition for the
eﬃcient and payoﬀ dominant equilibrium. Thus, if players try to coordinate in order
to maximize their joint payoﬀ, they should coordinate on the eﬃcient equilibrium.
3 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted at the experimental laboratory in the University of
Kiel (KIEEL). Subjects were volunteers recruited from students of diﬀerent depart-
ments at this university.
In our experimental design we modeled an industry consisting of 5 ﬁrms (n = 5)
with a default proﬁt Π0 = 200 and a discrete abatement cost schedule presented in
table I.






Table I: Abatement cost schedule.
Moreover, the regulator valuates the marginal damage of ambient pollution with
d = 50, thus choosing an optimal subsidy of s = 50. Abatement schedule and
marginal damage imply a socially optimal abatement level of a∗ = 2 for any i =
1,...,5, leading to an optimal aggregate abatement level of A∗ = 10.
5Joint proﬁts are given by:
n X
i=1







11In order to measure the sensitivity of the ﬁrms’ response to the size of the ﬁne,
we run diﬀerent treatments with ﬁnes of f = 60 and f = 90 for the collective ﬁning
mechanism, and the corresponding F = 300 and F = 450) for the random ﬁning
mechanism.
Besides the eﬃcient abatement allocation a∗ = (2,...,2), both the collective and
the random ﬁning game have a second symmetric equilibrium with a∗ = (0,...,0).
With our choice of parameters there are no asymmetric equilibria.
Table II summarizes the diﬀerent treatments including the corresponding ﬁnes,
taxes and subsidies.
Treatment Instrument Fine Subsidy Equilibria
Collective 60 Collective ﬁne 60 10A 0,2∗
Collective 90 Collective ﬁne 90 10A 0,2∗
Random 300 Random ﬁne 300 10A 0,2∗
Random 450 Random ﬁne 450 10A 0,2∗
Tax-Subsidy Tax or Subsidy 50(10 − A) 50(A − 10) 2∗
Table II: Experimental design and symmetric equilibria. The asterisk
denotes the socially optimum equilibrium and A =
Pn
i=1 ai.
The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fis-
chbacher [4]). After subjects had arrived at the laboratory, they were randomly
assigned to one of the computer terminals. Instructions6 were given and questions
were answered. The subjects were informed that communication was not allowed
until the end of the session. Every session involved 10 subjects who participated
in two of the treatments, each of which mimicking one of the three mechanisms
described in the section above. At the beginning of each treatment, subjects were
randomly matched with four other participants. In each treatment three trial rounds
were played in order to ensure the correct understanding of the mechanisms. After
the trial periods, subjects were again randomly rematched, being informed about
6The instructions are available upon request from the authors.
12this. During and after the treatments subjects were not informed about whom they
were matched with.
Subjects were told to play the role of a ﬁrm deciding on the reduction of some
pollutant below its default pollution level emax equal to 4 units. They were also
informed about the nature of the special mechanism, each of which allows a max-
imum level of ambient pollution A∗ equal to 10 units. Within this framework in
any decision period subjects were asked to simultaneously submit their abatement
decision ai by entering an integer number between 0 and 4 in the respective com-
puter program. After each period, subjects were informed on the screen about total
abatement eﬀort of all ﬁve members of the group and about their individual payoﬀ.
Each mechanism was administered as a non-cooperative game and was repeated
at least 20 periods7. After the 20th period a coin was ﬂipped to decide whether or
not one further period had to be played8. In case of continuation, a coin was ﬂipped
again after the additional round, and so on. The subjects were informed from the
beginning about this random termination of the treatment.
Subjects were paid in cash at the end of the experiment. To determine their
earnings from the experiment, one of the treatments was randomly chosen at the
end of the session9. Their ﬁnal payoﬀ consisted then of their cumulated proﬁts in
the selected treatment. Earnings during the experiments were designated in exper-
imental currency units (ECUs) and converted into e at the end of the experiment
using an exchange rate of 1e=300 ECUs. Six sessions, that lasted about 90 minutes
each, were conducted with an average earning of about 15 e.
Note that during the random ﬁning treatment a player’s per period payoﬀ be-
comes negative in case of being ﬁned. Hence it was theoretically possible that the
cumulative payoﬀ was negative after the last round. As a matter of fact, this never
happened in any session. The subjects were told that in case that the cumulative
payoﬀ became negative their ﬁnal payoﬀ would be zero. We had to do so, because
7Except for Collective 60 with inexperienced subjects where only 15 periods were played for
sure.
8As a result, between 20 and 24 periods were played.
9This procedure helps us to avoid any income eﬀect when playing the second treatment.
13we had advertised that subjects could earn a positive amount of money. We can-
not exclude that the (theoretical) possibility of non-negative ﬁnal payoﬀs induced
subjects to play more risky once they were ﬁned (because they had less to lose).
We could have avoided negative payoﬀs per round by choosing the default payoﬀ Π0
suﬃciently high. Doing so, however, would have resulted in an implicit restriction
on the relative variation of the ﬁne size (increasing Π0 makes the relative diﬀerence
between F = 300 and F = 450 much smaller).
3.1 Risk Attitude Test
At the end of the session, subjects were asked to answer a short questionnaire which,
besides some routine questions about age, gender, number of semesters, and subject
of their studies, also contained a test which was designed to measure their risk
attitude. Inspired by the Multiple Price List procedure used by Laury and Holt [9]
to elicit risk attitudes, we presented a menu of choices to the subjects, as illustrated
in table 3.1. This test is based on 11 choices between a sure payoﬀ and a lottery.
Situation Option A Option B
1 150 ECU lottery
2 170 ECU lottery
3 190 ECU lottery
4 210 ECU lottery
5 230 ECU lottery
6 250 ECU lottery
7 270 ECU lottery
8 290 ECU lottery
9 310 ECU lottery
10 330 ECU lottery
11 350 ECU lottery
Table III: Risk attitude test. The lottery op-
tion involves a gain of 600 ECU with a 50%
probability and zero otherwise.
14When presenting the questionnaire, subjects were informed that, depending on
their choices, an additional amount of money could be earned. The procedure
to determine this payoﬀ was as follows: one of the choice situations was randomly
picked with equal probability. Then we used a dice in order to determine the outcome
of the lottery if the subject had decided to choose the lottery in that choice situation.
On average, subjects got an additional earning of 3 e from the risk test.
From the pattern of choices observed in this questionnaire, a risk attitude coef-
ﬁcient was computed for each of the subjects. This coeﬃcient corresponds to the
number of consecutive choices of the lottery (option B) before switching to the sure
payoﬀ (option A) and ranks from 0 to 11. In other words, the higher the coeﬃcient,
the lower the risk aversion of the subject.
According to the standard theory on individual decision making under risk, a risk
neutral subject will always choose the option that gives the highest expected payoﬀ.
Therefore, the choice pattern of a risk neutral subject would be 8 consecutive times
option B (lottery) until the sure payoﬀ in option A takes the value of 310 ECUs and
exceeds the expected payoﬀ of the lottery which is 300 ECUs. As a consequence,
the risk coeﬃcient of a risk neutral agent will be between 8 and 9. In the same way,
a risk averse subject will show a lower coeﬃcient while a subject considered as risk
seeking will be assigned a higher coeﬃcient.
Following this criterion we classify a subject as “highly risk averse” when the
number of lottery choices before switching to the sure option is 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4, as
“risk averse” when the number of choices is 5, 6, or 7, as “risk neutral” when the
number of choices is 8 or 9, and ﬁnally as “risk seeking” when the number of choices
is 10 or 11.
4 Results
In the following we will for short refer to as “Collective 60” (“Collective 90”) for
the collective ﬁning mechanism with a collective ﬁne of f = 60 (f = 90), and
to “Random 300” (“Random 450”) for the random mechanism with an individual
15ﬁne of F = 300 (F = 450). The tax-subsidy mechanism is simply referred to as
“Tax-Subsidy”.
Moreover, we will distinguish between experienced and inexperienced subjects.
With experienced subjects we refer those which have already participated in one
other treatment (mechanism) during one session. Inexperienced subjects, by con-
trast, participated in one of the treatments for the ﬁrst time, i.e. they do not have
experience from any other of our diﬀerent treatments. No subject played the same
treatment more than once.10 Therefore, subjects could only gather experience from
any other of the tested mechanisms.
The presentation of our results is organized as follows: ﬁrst, we will discuss the
eﬃciency of each tested mechanism to induce the socially desirable outcome and to
solve the group moral hazard problem. Secondly, we study the eﬀect of experience in
each of the tested instruments. Thirdly, we will compare the collective and random
ﬁning mechanisms to test for the hypothesis that the behavior of a risk neutral
subject should not be aﬀected by the nature of the ﬁning system (collective vs.
random). Finally, we test the sensitivity of the observed results under each of the
tested mechanisms with respect to the subjects’ risk attitude.
4.1 Eﬃciency in Inducing the Socially Desirable Outcome
As a ﬁrst approach to the results, ﬁgure 1 shows the average abatement level per
period for each of the tested mechanisms. For the Tax-Subsidy we ﬁnd a rather stable
average outcome of 2 units abated whereas for both the collective and the random
ﬁning mechanisms we observe frequent outcomes of aggregate under-abatement with
a decreasing trend as the number of periods proceeds.11
Table IV presents the average individual abatement per treatment for the pooled
10Furthermore, each player participated either in Collective 60 or in Collective 90, or either in
Random 300 or Random 450.
11This sort of dynamics is also typical for contributions to a public good under the voluntary
contribution mechanism where the starting point is something around 50% of the full contribution
(2 units in our setting) followed then by a signiﬁcant decrease in contribution (abatement level in























































































































































































Figure 1: Mean individual abatement level per period for each treatment.
17data as well as for both inexperienced and experienced subjects aggregated over all
periods. Evidence from those aggregate data suggests that the tax-subsidy mech-
anism works best to induce the socially desirable abatement. However, an average
abatement of two units, say, may result from averaging out ineﬃcient individual
abatement eﬀorts such as ai = 1 and ai = 3. Hence, in order to obtain a clearer
picture about the performance of the mechanisms we have to look at the frequency
distributions of choices regarding subjects’ abatement level.
Treatment
Aggregate Inexperienced Experienced
Mean S.D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Collective 60 1.13 1.10 1.17 1.00 1.11 1.13
Collective 90 1.28 1.15 1.85 0.98 0.99 1.11
Random 300 1.19 1.09 1.53 1.12 0.98 1.01
Random 450 1.27 1.09 1.57 1.07 1.09 1.06
Tax-Subsidy 2.06 0.96 2.00 0.93 2.11 1.00
Table IV: Summary statistics on the average individual abate-
ment per treatment.
Let us start to discuss the results for the collective and random ﬁning mech-
anisms. From ﬁgure 2 we observe that, in all treatments, inexperienced subjects
decided to abate 2 units (the eﬃcient eﬀort) at a frequency between 40% and 53%.
For experienced subjects, the distribution of decisions becomes bimodal with
two peaks at 0 and 2 units of abatement. Now approximately 50% of the decisions
coincide with the ineﬃcient equilibrium outcome, ai = 0, and only between 30%
and 40% of individual decisions remain at the socially optimal level of 2 units. In
fact, if we compare the distribution of decisions for inexperienced versus experienced
subjects by using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test, it turns out that diﬀerences are
statistically signiﬁcant for all tested mechanisms but Collective 60.
Regarding the tax-subsidy mechanism we observe that inexperienced subjects
chose the socially optimal level at a frequency of 50%. Experienced subjects, by




































































































































































Figure 2: Frequency distribution of individual abatement levels per treatment.
193 units in 31.8% of all cases (against a 14.1% with inexperienced subjects), 1 unit
in 12.3%, and 0 units in 9.3% of the cases [see also Figure 2(e)]. Employing a KS
test, we can conﬁrm that the diﬀerence in distributions between inexperience and
experience conditions is statistically signiﬁcant (α = 0.007). Note that whereas
under-abatement, i.e. playing ai = 1 or even ai = 0, is not quite rational given the
incentives of the tax-subsidy mechanism, over-abatement can be well explained as
a trial to coordinate on the collusive outcome.
4.2 Eﬃciency Comparison
In order to fully compare the outcomes of our diﬀerent mechanisms with respect to
eﬃciency, and also to compare our results to those of other studies which analyze
the performance of similar control mechanisms, we compute the relative eﬃciency
of each of the tested instruments.
Following Spraggon [18], we deﬁne (relative) eﬃciency as the ratio of the welfare
diﬀerence between observed welfare (SWObserved), resulting from application of the
respective instrument, and welfare under laissez faire, (SWNo regulation), on the one
hand, and the welfare diﬀerence between the social optimal outcome (SWOptimum)and
laissez faire, on the other:
E =
SWObserved − SWNo regulation
SWOptimum − SWNo regulation
× 100 (12)
Note that given our setting, eﬃciency cannot be negative12 and therefore will
range between 0 and 100.
Table V shows that the tax-subsidy mechanism outperforms both the group ﬁne
and the random ﬁne game. An exception from this is the ﬁndings by Cochard
et al. [3] who, however, use a ﬁne 8 times higher as necessary to make the ﬁrm
indiﬀerent between compliance and non-compliance. Under this setting, they obtain
an eﬃciency of 60% under the collective ﬁne, being more eﬃcient than the tax-
12In Cochard et al. [3] it is possible for the control instrument to induce negative eﬃciency
values. This results from their special setting where the subjects’ decisions generate externalities



























































































































































































































































































































































































21subsidy mechanism (with an eﬃciency of -41%). By contrast, Spraggon [18] uses a
ﬁne 2.13 times the maximum deviating net gain (thus comparable to our Collective
90 treatment) and for inexperienced (experienced) subjects obtains an eﬃciency of
54% (78%) under the group ﬁne mechanism against an eﬃciency of 98% (96%) for
the tax-subsidy. Vossler et al. [19] ﬁnd that allowing for “cheap talk” increases the
eﬃciency of the group ﬁne from 42% to 72%, whereas “cheap talk” reduces eﬃciency
from 56% to -174% in the tax-subsidy mechanism since subjects seem to coordinate
on the collusive outcome. We summarize these ﬁndings in the following result:
Result 1: The tax-subsidy mechanism performs better than the collective and
random ﬁning instrument in inducing the socially optimal outcome.
4.3 Treatment Eﬀect and the Dynamics of Abatement De-
cisions
Table VI presents the result of a panel regression estimate (random eﬀects GLS
estimation) to analyze individual data as well as dynamics over time. Given that
we collected observations for each subject during a certain number of periods, the
panel estimation allows us to explicitly estimate speciﬁc eﬀects which are common
to an individual across periods, but might diﬀer across subjects.
In order to account for treatment eﬀects, we used the data of individual abate-
ment for Collective 60 as baseline and studied how a change in the control mechanism
aﬀects abatement decisions. For this purpose, we included dummies for each tested
mechanism in the regression.
In addition to the treatment eﬀects we included also the regressors “experience”
and “period” to account for the eﬀect of experience and repetition, respectively.
Finally, we included a regressor which indicates whether or not the own abatement
eﬀort exceeds the mean abatement of other group members in the previous period.
We did so because the aggregate abatement eﬀort was the only information available
to the subjects at the end of each period, and because we wanted to ﬁnd out how
subjects react on this information. This variable is written as “ait−1 > Averaget−1”.
22Its value is equal to the diﬀerence |ait−1 − Averaget−1| if ait−1 exceeds the average
abatement of the other members of the group (Averaget−1) and is zero otherwise.
In a similar way, we deﬁne “ait−1 < Averaget−1” for negative deviations.
Variable Coef. S.E. p > |z|
Constant 1.5617 0.0792 0.000
Collective 90 0.2286 0.0665 0.001
Random 300 -0.0328 0.0608 0.589
Random 450 0.3563 0.0611 0.000
Tax-Subsidy 1.0161 0.0574 0.000
Experience -0.3175 0.0349 0.000
Period -0.0260 0.0027 0.000
ait−1 > Averaget−1 0.0516 0.0237 0.030





Table VI: Random Eﬀects GLS Regression.
It is natural to conjecture that under the collective and the random ﬁning mecha-
nisms higher fees induce higher levels of abatement. In order to test this hypothesis,
we tested a ﬁne 1.5 (2.25) times the minimum amount that satisﬁes condition (10)
by imposing an individual ﬁne of 60 ECUs (90 ECUs) whenever the aggregate abate-
ment falls short of 10 units. If we assume that in the absence of regulation ﬁrms
choose an abatement level of 0 units, a Wilcoxon test shows that a group ﬁne of
60 ECUs increases abatement with respect to the laissez faire situation since the
mean abatement level of 1.13 units for Collective 60 is signiﬁcantly higher than 0.
Moreover, from table VI we can conclude that our hypothesis regarding an increase
in the ﬁne is correct since the coeﬃcient for Collective 90 is signiﬁcant and positive.
Another interesting result comes from the comparison of the collective and ran-
dom ﬁning mechanisms. Interestingly, the results are related to the ﬁne size. Al-
though the two mechanisms perform equivalently with a low ﬁne - this can be seen
23form the coeﬃcient of Random 300 which is not signiﬁcant - they induce diﬀerent
outcomes when we use a higher ﬁne. Thus, the null hypothesis that the coeﬃcients
for Collective 90 and Random 450 are equal can be rejected using a Chi-square
test (α = 0.029). This means that, with a high ﬁne, the random ﬁning mechanism
increases abatement when compared to the collective ﬁne.
To ﬁnish with the treatment eﬀects, note that, as expected, abatement eﬀort un-
der the tax-subsidy mechanism is signiﬁcantly higher than under both the collective
and the random ﬁning mechanisms.
Turning our attention now to the dynamics of the outcomes, we observe that
experience and repetition signiﬁcantly reduce abatement. Concerning the use of the
information about the deviations from the group average, both coeﬃcients for posi-
tive and negative deviations are signiﬁcant. This means that if a subject over-abated
with respect to the other members of the group (ait−1 > Averaget−1), the estimated
coeﬃcient indicates that he/she increases his/her contribution in the next period.
However, when he/she under-abated (ait−1 < Averaget−1) in the past period, the
negative sign of the respective coeﬃcient indicates a decrease in his/her contribu-
tion. The reaction on past over-abatement could be explained by the existence of
subjects who do not want to be ﬁned and decide to increase abatement, or who
want to signal the possibility of collusion in the case of tax-subsidy. By contrast,
a decrease in abatement eﬀort given past under-abatement compared to the group
average could be explained by the rationale that given the group average is below
2 anyway, further reduction of abatement saves costs whereas the chance to induce
the eﬃcient outcome by raising abatement is low.
4.4 A closer Look at Experience
The signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcient for experience in Table VI clearly shows that
experience plays an important role on abatement decisions. In order to study how
experience aﬀects the diﬀerences among treatments and dynamics, table VII reports
the results of panel regressions for inexperienced and experienced subjects.
We observe that in the case of inexperienced subjects our results are similar to
24Variable
Inexperienced subjects Experienced subjects
Coef. S.E. p > |z| Coef. S.E. p > |z|
Constant 1.2489 0.1829 0.000 1.6383 0.1125 0.000
Collective 90 0.6952 0.2489 0.005 -0.2259 0.1620 0.163
Random 300 0.4151 0.2485 0.095 -0.3877 0.1143 0.001
Random 450 0.4572 0.2484 0.066 -0.0963 0.1627 0.554
Tax-Subsidy 0.8644 0.2164 0.000 1.0289 0.0823 0.000
Period -0.0100 0.0039 0.012 -0.0388 0.0034 0.000
ait−1 > Averaget−1 0.0656 0.0415 0.114 0.0226 0.0287 0.430




ˆ ρ 0.2558 0.2584
Table VII: Random Eﬀects GLS Regression, inexperienced and experienced subjects.
those of the pooled sample reported in table VI. The main diﬀerence we ﬁnd is a
higher coeﬃcient for Collective 90, which means that an increase in the ﬁne raises
abatement signiﬁcantly when applied to inexperienced subjects. However, once sub-
jects gain experience, this eﬀect disappears. I.e. with experience, an increase in the
ﬁne has no eﬀect on the abatement decisions. Moreover, when the random ﬁning
is applied with a low ﬁne, this signiﬁcantly reduces abatement decisions compared
to the collective ﬁne, as we can see from the negative coeﬃcient for Random 300.
Therefore we obtain as second result:
Result 2: An increase in the ﬁne induces a higher abatement level only when
applied to inexperienced subjects.
Table IV conﬁrms that subjects’ decisions under both, collective and random
ﬁning suﬀer from under-abatement since the observed average individual abatement
level lies below the social optimum of 2 units per subject. By performing a Wilcoxon
test we can reject the null hypothesis that the observed average individual abate-
ment is equal to 2. This holds for all treatments and for both, inexperienced and
25experienced subjects. Moreover a Mann-Whitney (MW) test shows that the dif-
ference between the mean abatement of inexperienced and experienced subjects is
statistically signiﬁcant for all treatments (α = 0.00), but Collective 60 (α = 0.92).
Concerning the eﬀect of experience when the tax-subsidy mechanism is applied,
we observe from table VII that the abatement level is signiﬁcantly higher when com-
pared to the collective and random ﬁning for both, inexperienced and experienced
subjects. Whereas experience reduced abatement in all other treatments, comparing
the coeﬃcients for Tax-Subsidy a Chi-square test (α = 0.004) shows that experience
raises abatement under the tax-subsidy mechanism. Moreover, using a Wilcoxon
test we cannot reject the hypothesis at a 10% signiﬁcance level (α = 0.08) that the
tax-subsidy mechanism with experienced subjects suﬀers from over-abatement. All
these ﬁndings are summarized in the following result:
Result 3: Experience in diﬀerent control instruments tends to induce over-
abatement under the tax-subsidy mechanism and under-abatement under both the
collective and the random ﬁning mechanisms.
As far as the dynamics is concerned, the eﬀect of repetition is signiﬁcantly higher
in the cases where subjects are experienced (Chi-square test, α = 0.000).
Regarding the deviations from the group average in the past period, once sub-
jects gain experience, positive deviations (over-abatement) are no more signiﬁcant,
while those subjects who abated below the group average keep on decreasing their
abatement level.
4.5 Sensitivity to Assumptions about the Risk Attitude
Experimental studies often do not provide data on subjects’ risk attitude since many
experimental researchers simply assume subjects to be risk neutral when facing the
low-payoﬀ usually oﬀered in the lab. However, it has been shown by Holt and
Laury [9] that even with a payoﬀ of only several dollars, usually used as reward in
laboratory experiments, most subjects proved to be risk averse and only very few
26proved to be risk seeking.
With respect to the theoretical literature on non-point source pollution, Herriges
et al. [7] show that, in a budget-balancing mechanism, the random ﬁning will only
induce compliance if subjects are risk averse. Nevertheless, the measurement of
subjects’ risk attitude has been ignored in experimental studies on these mechanisms.
As described above, we performed a risk test with each subject. Out of 60
subjects that participated in the diﬀerent sessions, 12 (20.7%) were classiﬁed as
highly risk averse (HRA), 20 (34.5%) as risk averse (RA) and 22 (36.1%) as risk
neutral (RN). Finally, only 4 subjects revealed to be risk seeking.13
Table VIII presents the average individual abatement per treatment when we




Highly Risk Averse Risk Averse Risk Neutral
Collective 60 0.99 1.09 1.18
Collective 90 1.76 1.22 1.27
Random 300 0.99 1.36 1.29
Random 450 1.30 1.25 1.26
Tax-Subsidy 1.88 1.99 2.25
Table VIII: Summary statistics on the average individual abatement
per treatment and risk attitude.
The results of table VIII show that whereas some ﬁndings are robust with respect
to the risk attitude of the subjects, others are not. In order to test for diﬀerences due
to treatment eﬀects, table IX presents the results of a random eﬀects panel regression
estimate of the model ﬁrst presented in table VI in section 4.3. However, we now
divided the subjects pool into three categories depending on their risk coeﬃcient.
13Two subjects answered in an inconsistent way, therefore, we did not include their data in the
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































28Using again the data from Collective 60 as baseline, table IX conﬁrms result 2
regarding the eﬀect of increasing the ﬁne. Moreover, this eﬀect turns out to be robust
with respect to the subjects’ degree of risk aversion since the estimated coeﬃcients
for Collective 90 and Random 450 are again signiﬁcant and positive for all three
groups.
Let us now compare the performance of the collective and random ﬁning mech-
anisms. Table IX shows that, independently of the degree of risk aversion, the
coeﬃcient for the corresponding random ﬁning treatment Random 300 is not signif-
icant. However, this is not the case when a higher ﬁne is used. We observe that the
“risk averse” subjects abate signiﬁcantly more under random (Random 450) than
under collective (Collective 90) ﬁning. For the “risk neutral” subjects no diﬀerence
in performance between collective and random ﬁning can be observed. This is per-
fectly in line with the predictions of economic theory. Surprisingly, however, this
holds also for the group of “highly risk averse” subjects.
Result 4: When a high ﬁne is used, the performance of the collective and random
ﬁning mechanisms is the same for risk neutral as for highly risk averse subjects.
However, for risk averse subjects the random ﬁning outperforms the collective ﬁning.
As far as the tax-subsidy mechanism is concerned, its performance is not signif-
icantly aﬀected by diﬀerent risk attitudes of the subjects:
Result 5: The eﬃciency of the tax-subsidy mechanism to control non-point
source pollution is robust against diﬀerent degrees of risk aversion.
Regarding the dynamics, as asserted in result 3, previous experience in control
mechanisms reduces abatement. Interestingly, the eﬀect of experience on risk averse
subjects is signiﬁcantly lower when compared to the performance of the other two
groups. Moreover, a decrease in the abatement due to the eﬀect of repetition is once
again signiﬁcant and independent of subjects’ risk aversion.
Finally, the estimates for the last two variables included in table IX show that
29only risk averse and risk neutral subjects react to feedback about the group aggregate
abatement in the previous period.
5 Conclusions
We have presented the results on pollution control instruments designed to deal
with non-point source pollution. In particular we tested a tax-subsidy mechanism,
suggested by Segerson [16], and a non-budget balancing version of the collective and
a random ﬁning mechanisms suggested by Xepapadeas [21].
From our results we can conclude that the tax-subsidy mechanism seems to
be more suitable to induce the subjects to choose the socially optimal abatement
level. Both, collective and random ﬁning schemes, by contrast, suﬀer from serious
under-abatement, a feature which is exacerbated over time and through players’
experience.
When controlling for the eﬀect of diﬀerent ﬁne sizes, we surprisingly found that
only under the collective ﬁning mechanism when applied to inexperienced subjects
a higher ﬁne induced higher levels of compliance.
An important novelty of this paper compared to previous studies is that we
controlled for the subjects’ risk aversion using a simple risk test carried out at the
end of each experimental session. We divided the subjects’ data into three diﬀerent
groups (highly risk averse, risk averse and risk neutral) in order to study diﬀerent
hypotheses on the role of risk aversion on subjects’ behavior. As a result, we obtain
that the eﬃciency of the tax-subsidy mechanism is not aﬀected by agents’ risk
attitude. It has an impact, however, on the performance of the the collective and
random ﬁnes. Our results conﬁrm the hypothesis that the behavior of risk neutral
subjects in not aﬀected by a change in the ﬁning mechanism, since the expected
gains are identical. Risk averse subjects by contrast abate more under the random
than under the collective ﬁning. This result conﬁrms the results of Herriges et
al. [7] according to which a random ﬁne would induce compliance in the presence
of suﬃciently risk averse subjects. For highly risk averse subjects, however, this
30diﬀerence surprisingly disappears.
Finally, as possible extensions, it would be interesting to also test for the eﬀects
of group size. Weersink et al. [20] suggest that the ambient taxes perform better
when applied to a small group of polluters. Moreover, Alp´ ızar et al. [2] found higher
compliance for collective and random ﬁning games when conducting the experiments
for groups of 2.
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33Instructions
[For the convenience of the referees, not to be published]
General Instructions
You are taking part in an economic experiment on decision making. The experiment
consists of two diﬀerent sub-experiments (treatments). Each treatment lasts over
several rounds in each of which you can earn some money. Your payoﬀ does not only
depend on your own decision but also on the decisions of other players. During the
experiment your payoﬀ will be measured in experimental currency units (ECUs).
At the end of the experiment your payoﬀ will be converted into e at an exchange
rate of 300:1, i.e. 300ECUs=1e.
At the end of the experiment one of the treatments, to be randomly chosen, will
determine your ﬁnal payoﬀ. Each of you will be rewarded individually and without
being observed by other subjects which have taken part in the experiment.
Each treatment lasts at least 20 rounds. At the end of round 20, we will ﬂip a
coin. If the coin show “tails”, the experiment will be terminated. If the coin show
“heads”, the experiment will be continued for one more round. At the end of that
round a coin will be ﬂipped again to determine whether or not a further round is
played, and so on.
At the beginning of each treatment you will be randomly matched with 4 other
subjects. During one treatment you will stay within the same group. However,
neither during nor after the experiment you will know the identity of the other
persons within your group. Before each treatment starts, you will be again randomly
rematched.
The economic background and the rules of the experiment:
Consider an industry consisting of 5 ﬁrms. Imagine you are the manager of one
of those ﬁrms. Each member of the group you are matched with, manages one of the
other 4 ﬁrms. Each ﬁrm produces some good with identical technologies. Production
causes pollution which will be released into a lake. A regulatory authority is not able
1to monitor the emissions of each individual ﬁrm but can only monitor the ambient
emission level of the lake. The authority tolerates an ambient emission level of 10
units (independently of which ﬁrm has emitted how much).
If a ﬁrm does not take abatement measures, it will emit 4 units into the lake.
The ﬁrm can, however, abate all the pollution (4 units), abate partially (3 units,
2 units, or 1 unit), or not abate at all (0 units). Abatement, however, is costly.
Both, the abatement costs and the marginal abatement costs, are displayed in the
following table: (see table I).
Explanation: The marginal abatement cost denotes the additional cost of abating
one additional unit. For example, if you want to increase your abatement from 3 to
4 units, this will cost you additional 80 ECUs. Your total abatement cost of abating
4 units is then 20 + 40 + 60 + 80 = 200 ECUs.
In each round of the experiment you and the managers of the other 4 ﬁrms must
decide simultaneously and independently of each other how many units you want to
abate. You have the choice to abate 0, 1, 2, 3, or 4 units.
After you have made your choices, the authority measures the ambient pollution
level of the lake and takes diﬀerent measures, in the following treatments.
Collective Fine
Collective 60
After you have made your choices, the authority measures the ambient pollution
level of the lake and takes the following measure:
1. The authority pays a subsidy of 50 ECUs for each abated unit to the whole
industry. Each ﬁrm receives 20% of the total subsidy to the industry, i.e. your
subsidy amounts to 10 × (sum of the total amount of abated units).
2. If the total abatement of all 5 ﬁrms is less than 10 units (i.e. more than 10
units are emitted into the lake), each ﬁrm must pay a ﬁne of 60 ECUs.
Note again that the regulator cannot observe the individual emissions. At the
end of each round you will be informed about the total abatement eﬀort (and thus
2the total emissions released into the lake).
Your payoﬀ per round is determined as follows:
If all ﬁve ﬁrms have abated at least 10 units (i.e. no more than 10 units have
been emitted into the lake), your proﬁt will be:
200 - (your abatement cost) + (your subsidy).
If all ﬁve ﬁrms have abated less than 10 units (i.e. more than 10 units have been
emitted into the lake), your proﬁt will be:
200 - (your abatement cost) + (your subsidy) - 60.
Example 1:
You abate 3 units in one round, the other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 11 units in the
same round. In this case, your abatement cost amounts to 120 ECUs. The regulator
pays a total subsidy of 50 × 14 = 700 ECUs. Your share of the subsidy is then given
by 10 × 14 = 140 ECUs.
Your payoﬀ in this round is then: 200 - 120 + 140 = 220
Example 2:
You abate 2 units in one round, the other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 7 units in the
same round. In this case, your abatement cost amounts to 60 ECUs. The regulator
pays a total subsidy of 50 × 9 = 450 ECUs. Your share of the subsidy is then given
by 10 × 9 = 90 ECUs. The regulator ﬁnes each ﬁrm by 60 ECUs since only 9 units
have been abated and thus 11 units have been emitted into the lake.
Your payoﬀ in this round is then: 200 - 60 + 90 - 60 = 170
If anything is still unclear please feel free to ask before the experiment starts.
During the experiment no communication is allowed.
Collective 90
As for Collective 90, but the ﬁne amounts now 90 ECUs instead of 60 ECUs.
3Random Fine
Random 300
After you have made your choices, the authority measures the ambient pollution
level of the lake and takes the following measure:
1. The authority pays a subsidy of 50 ECUs for each abated unit to the whole
industry. Each ﬁrm receives 20% of the total subsidy to the industry, i.e. your
subsidy amounts to 10 × (sum of the total amount of abated units).
2. If the total abatement of all 5 ﬁrms is less than 10 units (i.e. more than 10
units are emitted into the lake), the regulator picks one ﬁrm randomly and ﬁnes this
ﬁrm by 300 ECUs.
Note again that the regulator cannot observe the individual emissions. At the
end of each round you will be informed about the total abatement eﬀort (and thus
the total emissions into he lake).
Your payoﬀ per round is determined as follows:
If all 5 ﬁrms have abated at least 10 units (i.e. no more than 10 units have been
emitted into the lake, your proﬁt will be:
200 - (your abatement cost) + (your subsidy).
If all ﬁve ﬁrms have abated less than 10 units (i.e. more than 10 units have been
emitted into the lake) and the regulator picks you for ﬁning, your proﬁt will be:
200 - (your abatement cost) + (your subsidy) - 300.
If all ﬁve ﬁrms have abated less than 10 units (i.e. more than 10 units have been
emitted into the lake) and the regulator does not pick you for ﬁning, your proﬁt will
be:
200 - (your abatement cost) + (your subsidy).
Example 1:
You abate 3 units in one round, the other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 11 units in the
same round. In this case, your abatement cost amounts to 120 ECUs. The regulator
4pays a total subsidy of 50 × 14 = 700 ECUs. Your share of the subsidy is then given
by 10 × 14 = 140 ECUs.
Your payoﬀ in this round is then: 200 - 120 + 140 = 220
Example 2:
You abate 4 units in one round, the other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 5 units in the
same round. In this case, your abatement cost amounts to 200 ECUs. The regulator
pays a total subsidy of 50 × 9 = 450 ECUs. Your share of the subsidy is then given
by 10 × 9 = 90 ECUs. The regulator picks now one ﬁrm randomly and ﬁnes it by
300 ECUs since only 9 units have been abated and thus 11 units have been emitted
into the lake.
If your ﬁrm is picked for ﬁning, your payoﬀ in this round will be:
200 - 200 + 90 - 300 = -210
If your ﬁrm is not picked for ﬁning, your payoﬀ in this round will be:
200 - 200 + 90 = 90
Note that it can happen that your payoﬀ in one round will be negative. It can
also happen that the accumulative payoﬀ at the end of treatment is negative. If this
is the case your total payoﬀ will be set equal to zero.
If anything is still unclear please feel free to ask before the experiment starts.
During the experiment no communication is allowed.
Random 450
As for Random 300, but the ﬁne amounts now 450 ECUs instead of 300 ECUs.
Tax-Subsidy
After you have made your choices, the authority measures the ambient pollution
level of the lake and takes the following measure:
1. If a total of less than 10 units have been emitted into the lake (i.e. more
than 10 units have been abated by all ﬁve ﬁrms), the regulator pays a subsidy of 50
ECUs per abated unit exceeding the level of 10 to each ﬁrm.
52. If a total of more than 10 units have been emitted into the lake (i.e. less than
10 units have been abated by all ﬁve ﬁrms), the regulator charges a tax of 50 ECUs
per unit abated too little to each ﬁrm.
3. If exactly 10 units have been emitted into the lake, neither a subsidy is payed,
nor a tax is charged.
Your payoﬀ per round is determined as follows:
200 - (your abatement cost) + 50 × (sum of the abated units minus 10)
Example 1:
You abate 3 units in one round. Your abatement cost amount to 120 ECUs. The
other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 8 units in the same round. Hence a total of 11 units
have been abated, one more than demanded. The regulator pays a subsidy of 50 ×
(11-10) = 50 ECUs to each ﬁrm.
Your payoﬀ will then be: 200 - 120 + 50 = 130
Example 2:
You abate 2 units in one round. Your abatement cost amount to 60 ECU. The
other 4 ﬁrms abate a total of 6 units in the same round. Hence a total of 8 units
have been abated, two less than demanded. The regulator charges each ﬁrm a tax
of 50 × (10-8) = 100 ECUs.
Your payoﬀ will then be: 200 - 60 - 100 = 40
If anything is still unclear please feel free to ask before the experiment starts.
During the experiment no communication is allowed.
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